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Chapter 2 
The gathering storm 
Modernisation, Local Alignment and Collaboration 
Fire and Rescue Services under the early New Labour administrations from 1997 to 2005. 
Pete Murphy and Kirsten Greenhalgh 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will look at one of the most turbulent periods in the history of the Local Government and 
Fire Services in particular in England. It was a period that saw ‘an unprecedented attempt by UK central 
government to transform the politics and performance of English local government’ with the result being 
‘a decade of unprecedented change, which had profound implications for the governance of local 
communities and management of local services (Downe and Martin, 2007). How this agenda played out 
in the Fire Services is one of the most interesting but surprisingly confusing stories of the period from 
1997 to 2005. Modernisation during this period was generally regarded more positively in other public 
services, such as local government and the NHS, and much needed changes in the Fire Service were 
slower to materialise. As we will see from the next chapter, by the time New Labour left office in 2010, 
the Fire Service was much more positively engaged in a public service improvement agenda focussing on 
prevention, protection and collaborative working across public services. This chapter focusses on the 
complex and fascinating earlier period of 1997-2005.    
When Tony Blair’s New Labour government took office after the landslide election of 1997, 
responsibility for the fire and rescue services in England, Scotland and Wales was part of the Home 
Office’s portfolio. The service in Northern Ireland, which had been a single Fire and Recuse Service since 
the Belfast Fire Brigade and the Northern Ireland Fire Authority amalgamated in 1973, was the 
responsibility of the Northern Ireland Office. Northern Ireland was still under ‘direct rule’ from 
Westminster and the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 had yet to be signed. 
The relationship between the Home Office and the (then) Fire and Rescue Brigades could be 
characterised as one of ‘benign neglect’1 (Raynsford, 2016). The Home Office agenda and its media 
coverage was dominated by criminal justice, immigration, the prisons and the security services, all of 
which enjoyed a higher priority with the government of the time. Successive Home Secretaries and the 
fire services themselves were content to accept a low (some would say almost subterranean) profile. This 
is also a reasonable characterisation of the relationships between local fire brigades and the vast majority 
of local fire authorities as well as the relationship between local fire services collectively with the Local 
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Government Association and its predecessors. Fire and Rescue Services had been allowed to quietly 
ossify and they were ill prepared for the approaching ‘modernisation’ storm. 
The legislative basis for the service in essence, remained the 1947 Fire Services Act, which transferred the 
functions of the short-lived, National Fire Service, created as part of the response to the Blitz during the 
Second World War, back to local authority control. The Fire Services Act 1959, dealt primarily with 
pensions and staffing, and there was then no additional primary legislation prior to the New Labour 
administration coming to power in 1997. Various changes to the structure of Local Government, 
including the comprehensive reorganisation of 1974, caused barely a ripple in the services as the 
governance and management of the service elided into the new local authorities.      
This primary legislative inactivity was also reflected in a paucity of secondary legislation, policy guidance 
and performance data and information. The Audit Commission, following its creation in 1983, and prior 
to 1997, produced only two reports and a management handbook2, (Audit Commission 1986, 1995a, 
1995b )of fire services, despite the services being part of the annual collection of local authority 
performance data since its inception in 1993/943  (Audit Commission 1995c).               
In terms of the response to widespread emergencies, disasters and major incidents, it is sanguine to quote 
the Civil Contingencies Act. “Part 2 of the Act updates the 1920 Emergency Powers Act to reflect the 
developments in the intervening years and the current and future risk profile”.  The framework for 
cooperation and collaboration with the other emergency services was as neglected as the legislative and 
policy parameters for the service itself.  
The themes for this chapter 
This chapter will review the experience of the fire service under the first two New Labour (1995-2005) 
administrations. In order to focus the account, it will adopt three themes, although these themes clearly 
overlapped and were inter-related. The three themes are those included in the chapter title namely  
 modernisation,  
 local public service alignment, and  
 inter-agency partnership and collaboration.  
Prior to 1997 the service had suffered, as noted above, from a lack of direction from central government. 
Since 1976, it also suffered long-term under-investment from both central and local government and 
allowed outdated policies and practices, particularly in terms of its industrial relations, to generate an 
insular and defensive organisational culture. A series of reports into major disasters and emergencies also 
meant it was losing its reputation and the confidence of the public. It was about to change, albeit 
unwillingly. 
The period from 1997-2005 was a period of turbulence and unprecedented hostile industrial relations. It 
also saw some of the biggest changes in the service, as it culminated with the enactment and 
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implementation of the 2004 Fire and Rescue Services Act and the 2004 Civil Contingencies Act. This 
chapter attempts to chronicle these changes, while the following chapter will discuss the period from May 
2005 up until the election of the Coalition Government in May 2010. During the period from 2005 to 
2010 the service became more reconciled to the government’s agenda and significantly improved its 
performance and its relationship to the government and the public. 
The gathering storm 1997-2002 
In 1997, prior to the 1999 Greater London Authority Act, the formation of the London Fire and 
Emergency Planning Authority and the devolution of services to Scotland, and later Wales, there were 50 
fire and rescue services in England and Wales and 8 services in Scotland. They were all under local 
authority control (see table 1). The services varied in size from London and Strathclyde to the Isles of 
Scilly (see map 1) and this number and pattern of local services remained virtually unchanged in the 
period up to May 2005.  
The Northern Ireland Fire and Rescue Service was the responsibility of the Northern Ireland Office and 
there were a number of smaller specialised and private fire and rescue services. The Ministry of Defence, 
the Nuclear Authority and the Palace of Westminster all had their own fire services, as did the Airports, 
the main Ports and some large factories and industrial premises who operated private services. However, 
the remainder of this and subsequent chapters are primarily concerned with the local authority controlled 
services in England and Wales. 
 
Type of Fire Service  
England and Wales Scotland Northern 
Ireland 
Year County Combined Metropolitan London   
1997 16 27 6 1 8 1 
2005 16 27 6 1 8 1 
2016 15 24 6 1 1 1 
 
Table 1. Types of Fire Service in the UK 
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Map 1. Fire service in 1997 and 2005. (Source: Ordinance Survey, 2016)  
The period between 1997 and 2002 saw responsibility for the Fire Service move from the Home Office to 
the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) via a brief stint in the short-lived Department of 
Transport, Local Government and the Regions. The responsibility for emergency planning moved from 
the Home Office to the newly created Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat in 2001. It was a 
period that experienced a complete overhaul of the legislative basis for the service; the second national 
strike in the services history, and unprecedented upheaval in terms of policy and practice. 
However, the Conservatives approach of the Home Office to the Fire Service, which we have 
characterised as one of ‘benign neglect’ initially continued. In May 1997, Jack Straw replaced Michael, the 
outgoing Home Secretary. Howards’ tenure had been dominated by his tough approach to crime,4 and 
marked by controversies with the judiciary5 and the prison service.6  Whether, his famous dictum that, 
‘prison works’ was true or not, is another matter. What is not in doubt was that during his tenure, from 
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1993-1997, prison numbers doubled, from 42,000 to nearly 85,000, and were continuing to increase as a 
direct result of government changes to sentencing policy. The probation services were struggling to cope 
and Howard displayed little interest in the Fire Service.  
As Shadow Home Secretary, Jack Straw7 had an even more authoritarian reputation than Michael 
Howard. In office, he was soon embroiled in the Steven Lawrence affair and set up the Macpherson 
Inquiry that was later to find the Metropolitan Police Service was institutionally racist8. He also had a new 
electoral system for the European elections (proportional representation) to introduce and the Human 
Rights Act to steer onto the statute book. However, one of Straw’s first pieces of primary legislation as 
Home Secretary was to re-assert the need for multiple and several organisational responsibility for long-
term intractable social problems (which were coined the’ wicked issues’). This Act, and what followed, 
would radically affect the future scope, form and responsibilities of the Fire Services. 
Collaboration and alignment of local agencies 
The 1998 Crime and Disorder Act is more famous for its introduction of sex-offender, anti-social and 
parental orders, but the conceptual thinking and theoretical underpinning that the Act also re-introduced 
were actually more significant fundamental changes in the approach to the policy and practice of local 
service delivery.  
By 1997 policy makers and academics were much exercised by long term and seemingly intractable social, 
economic and environmental issues, the ‘wicked issues’. These issues were not, apparently, amenable to 
single agency solution or even mitigation. They required multiple agencies to work together to adopt a 
focussed, determined and co-ordinated approach in order to have significant impact.  
Crime and the rising levels of disorder in civil society were prime examples. The Act re-introduced two 
fundamental concepts: multiple and several responsibilities for addressing the problem at the local 
community level, and the need for joined up policy and delivery at local and national levels of 
government. Henceforth both the Chief Constable and the Chief Executive of the local authority were 
made personally responsible for producing and maintaining a crime and disorder audit, a reduction 
strategy and the establishment and leadership of a local partnership of key agencies. Central and Local 
government would co-produce policy and both would be mutually responsible for public service delivery. 
The 1998 Crime and Disorder Act, was the first example of both joined-up policy and delivery under 
New Labour, as well as multiple and several responsibility between agencies for tackling economic, social 
or environmental problems seemingly endemic in local communities. 
Collaboration and partnership working were not new but the period between 1979 and 1996, had seen a 
reduction in the number of formal and informal partnerships that local agencies were statutorily obliged 
to be actively engaged with. Individual agency and personal responsibility, were acknowledged to be 
appropriate for tackling some issues, but the persistence of crime and disorder, the rise in teenage 
pregnancies, the stubborn resistance of attainment levels in schools to improve or the increasing 
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inequality of health outcomes required a more collective approach. No longer was it a case of investing in 
prison or probation, health protection or hospitals, prevention rather than cure. It was now a question of 
joined up policy and practise, and investment in both sets of approaches. This led to the government’s 
early mantra for local service delivery of ‘what matters is what works’ (Labour Party 1997). Local 
Authorities, the local NHS, the Police and Fire Services were the core of the Local Crime and Disorder 
Reduction Partnerships, established by the Act, and many more of the local public service delivery 
partnerships that were to follow.    
Similarly, the 1980s and early 90s, had also seen a series of major incidents, emergencies and disasters that 
had clearly challenged the capacity and capabilities of the local emergency services, and required much 
more joined-up planning, reaction and response than the emergency services were able to provide. The 
Bradford and Kings Cross Fires; the Kegworth and Lockerby air crashes; the Hillsborough crush; the 
Loscoe methane explosions, and the multiple widespread flooding incidents all emphasised the 
importance of emergency planning and preparedness as well as a co-ordinated inter-agency response from 
the emergency services. The end of the ‘cold war’ in the early 90’s coincided with this rise in peacetime 
disasters, and emergency planning moved from a concentration on post nuclear attacks, to preparing for a 
much wider range of man-made and natural disasters. Multiple agency cooperation, co-ordination, and 
collaboration in response to large or widespread disasters was the only realistic way forward.  The three 
blue light services together with the local authorities were the core of the local emergency planning 
partnerships, which were to become Local Resilience Forums after the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.       
Fire Service Modernisation9. 
At the same time as the seemingly endless series of inquests or inquiries reporting on these  disasters was 
casting a critical spotlight onto the response from emergency services, the new government’s demand for 
‘modernisation’ of the public services was growing. Local Government and the NHS were in the 
vanguard of modernisation but criminal justice, the police and the fire service would not escape. 
Modernisation in the Fire Service was not the same as modernisation in local government or the NHS. 
However, the nature and form of Fire Service modernisation was, inevitably, heavily influenced by local 
authority modernisation, because Fire was a local authority service, and the other services then under 
local authority control were forging ahead with the governments’ agenda.  
The details, and the development of the fire sectors complex relationship to modernisation, can however 
only be understood by looking at the service with knowledge of three critical factors: 
 The benign neglect of the fire agenda by the Home Office, 
 the publication of two very critical independent reports into the service, and  
 the co-incidental release of two government documents, which, to this day have generated a 
conspiracy or cock-up debate, that will probably only be resolved by the official release of 
confidential papers in years to come.  
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It may have been deliberate, or it may have been a co-incidence, but the day that the white paper on Local 
Government Modernisation was released, was also the day that the government sent a letter to the Fire 
Services national negotiators, notifying them that the employers were seeking a more flexible negotiating 
framework at national level (Burchill 2004). This latter proposal was the source of what was to become 
only the second national strike by the firefighters unions and the first since the 1970’s. 
The dispute essentially revolved around, not only pay and conditions of service, but the general principle 
of devolving determination of pay and conditions from national negotiations to local resolutions. For a 
long time within the fire service this dispute became synonymous with ‘modernisation’ and eventually 
resulted in revised national negotiation arrangements. It really started with the letter in July 1998, although 
a formal strike was not called until November 2002 and was only resolved in July 2003.  
In 1999 Jack Straw appointed Professor Frank Burchill, Keele University’s first Professor of Industrial 
Relations, to conduct a review into the machinery for determining the conditions of service. His 
subsequent report, which was published in 2000 stated: 
“There has been an almost total lack of real political engagement in the fire services since the last firefighter’s 
strike in 1977. The 1947 Act is hopelessly outdated. Local Authority employers of fire brigades have, in 
general, shown a lack of leadership and purpose especially when acting together to negotiate pay and 
conditions. The Fire Brigades Union, while professing its enthusiasm for change, has shown no real 
commitment to making it happen from the centre and in many parts of the has mounted sustained and 
energetic opposition to change. The senior management of the Fire Service has shown a collective lack of 
leadership.” 
(Burchill, 2000 p.3)     
In July 1998, the government published the Local Government White Paper “Modern Local 
Government: in touch with the people” (DETR 1998), which quickly led to the Local Government Act 
1999. This act introduced a general duty of Best Value wherein authorities had to “make arrangements to 
secure continuous improvement in the way in which its functions are exercised, having regard to a 
combination of economy, efficiency and effectiveness.”. Public service organisations (or at least those 
designated as Best Value Authorities) had henceforth to seek to achieve Best Value in the procuring and 
delivery of services, and to facilitate the achievement of continuous improvement in all of their activities. 
In May 2001, responsibility for the Fire Service transferred from the Home Office to the short-lived 
Department of Transport, Local Government and Regions and, thence to the more powerful ODPM in 
May 2002.  However, the new duty of Best Value resulted in very few significant service reviews within 
Fire Services between 2000 and 2002. In September 2002, immediately after the summer recess, the 
Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott, announced the ‘Bain’ review. 
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The Bain review which reported in December 2002, as Burchill before it, pulled no punches about the 
need for the service to change. 
“We did not realise until we started this review just how much potential for reform exists in the current Fire 
Service. We were surprised at the extent to which the fire service has fallen behind best practice in the public 
and private sector. …The Fire Service needs to be changed from top to bottom and every aspect of its work 
reformed to bring it into line with best practice at the start of the twenty-first century”  
(Bain et al. 2002, pii).  
Local Government Modernisation 
Between 1998 and 2004, the local government modernisation agenda was central to the reform and 
improvement of locally delivered public services in England and Wales (Andrews et al.  2003, Martin and 
Bovaird 2005, Downe and Martin, 2007, Morphet, 2007, Laffin 2008) and fundamentally changed the 
relationship between central and local government. In 1999 the Department of the Environment, 
Transport and Regions, recruited a Local Government Modernisation Team of ex-local authority Chief 
Executives and Senior Officers to advise its Director of Local Government, Andrew Whetnall, on the 
implementation of emerging policy.  Whetnall, a career civil servant who had previously been in the 
Cabinet Office, had been responsible for the 1998 Local Government White Paper and the 1999 and 
2000 Local Government Acts. He was keen to ensure effective delivery, or ‘how’ policies should most 
effectively be delivered, as well as the traditional civil service concern with ‘what’ policy should be 
delivered.  After strengthening the team in November 2000, he had the modernisation team work 
alongside his career civil servants on the various aspects of modernisation, which are shown in the table 2.  
Although local government modernisation has generally been portrayed, in academia, as an exercise in 
introducing new public management theory, focussing primarily upon performance management regimes, 
it was much more complex and wide ranging than this in both theory and in practice. Whetnall and his 
team knew that, if it were to be successful, it had to be based on multiple and mutually reinforcing 
reforms across policy making, scrutiny and delivery of local government services. Table 2 was devised 
within the department in early 2001 to illustrate the various key work streams to the agenda and their role 
or focus. 
 
 
Local Government Modernisation Agenda 
 
Agenda 
 
Initiatives 
 
Legal basis and parameters  
 
The Power of Well Being 
 
9 
 
 
A Strategic Vision  
(derived from the community rather than the 
LA) 
 
 
Local Strategic Partnerships and Community 
Leadership 
 
Objectives  and Priorities  
(articulated and measureable) 
 
 
Community Strategies 
 
Efficient, effective and economic service 
delivery 
 
 
Best Value and collaborative working 
 
Better Decision Making 
 
 
New political structures 
(executive/ scrutiny split) 
 
 
Probity and openness 
 
 
A new ethical framework and standards board 
 
 
Innovation and organisational development 
 
 
New technology and E-government 
 
A sustainable long-term funding regime 
 
 
Review of local government finance 
 
 
Table 2. Modernisation Agenda 
 
At the same time as the main programmes and projects identified in table 2, above, were being initiated, 
developed and promoted a rich ecology of supporting organisations and projects were being established.  
These were later to become known as the improvement infrastructure.  Table 3, below, is by no means 
exhaustive but contains examples of both organisations and projects that were established or significantly 
developed around this time.  
 
Local Government Improvement Infrastructure 
 
Area of interest 
 
Project, programme or organisation 
 
Improving the evidence 
base for local government 
policy and delivery  
 
Improvement and Development Agency (IDeA) 
Local Authority Observatories (Web-based, Open and capable of 
interrogation) 
Knowledge Hubs(Web-based, Open and capable of 
interrogation) 
Employers Organisation (EO) 
 
 
 
Improving local 
government as delivery 
organisations 
 
Improvement and Development Agency (IDeA) 
The Local Government Leadership Centre 
Local Government Specialist Consultants 
Beacon Council Scheme 
Local Authority Coordinators of Regulatory Services (LACORS) 
Register of Accredited Political and Officers Peers 
Employers Organisation (EO) 
 
 
Improving interagency 
collaboration 
 
Improvement and Development Agency (IDeA) 
The Local Government Leadership Centre 
Beacon Council Scheme 
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4ps (Local Government Partnerships) 
 
 
Improving local 
government as community 
representatives 
 
 
Improvement and Development Agency (IDeA) 
The Local Government Leadership Centre 
The Standards Board 
The Centre for Public Scrutiny 
Register of Accredited Political and Officers Peers 
 
Table 3. Improvement Infrastructure 
Although these new organisations and initiatives were generated around the local Government 
‘Modernisation Agenda’ it was, of course, intended that all of these initiatives would be applied in the Fire 
Service. However, in the early days of 1999-2002, the focus was on neighbourhood renewal, Best Value, 
changes to political structures, the development of delivery partnerships and the performance of the 
major local government services principally education, social services benefits administration and waste 
services. In short, fire services were not a priority and until Bain revealed the scale of improvement 
needed. They were keen to keep a low profile and were much more exercised by industrial relations, terms 
and conditions of services and workforce development.  
By 2001, the team in the DTLR had were also working on five new initiatives. Local Strategic 
Partnerships, Local Public Service Agreements, the local e-government strategy, the commissioning of 
Comprehensive Performance Assessments and preparations and piloting for the intervention by central 
government in ‘failing’ or significantly underperforming local authorities or their services. All of these, 
together with the devolution and regional agendas, came together under the auspices of the Office of the 
Deputy Prime Minister under John Prescott. All of them affected or were applicable to Fire Services and 
Authorities. 
However, as mentioned earlier, the ‘distraction’ of the Bain review, the subsequent long running national 
dispute, together with the strength of the services’ organisational culture, and the partial and weak 
application of the first  performance management regime for fire, meant that the impact of the 
modernisation agenda was much less influential than in the rest of local government.     
After accepting every recommendation in the Burchill Report, a new National Joint Council (NJC) for the 
UK Fire and Rescue Services was established. From 2000 to 2008 Frank Burchill was its chairman, and 
the NJC played a key part in the settlement of the dispute. The national dispute dominated this period 
and even after its resolution in July 2003, it was immediately followed by the introduction of the new 
Integrated Personal Development System for fire service staff and the development of Integrated Risk 
Management Planning for the organisations. It was these initiatives that tended to dominate the post-
dispute ‘modernisation’ agenda at the personal and organisational levels rather than Best Value the need 
for continuous improvement, collaboration across local services, joined-up delivery or the new 
performance management arrangements that local government had by then embraced.  
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The new pay deal was dependent upon rapid progress towards the government’s broader definition of 
modernisation and in order to trigger the new pay deal the Audit Commission was asked to verify 
progress (Andrews 2010).  It was therefore asked to carry out two verification reports in March and 
September 2004 (Audit Commission 2004a, 2004b).  The reports were to “assess progress by fire 
authorities in England and Wales in implementing the modernisation agenda as set out in the national pay 
agreement and the subsequent white paper” (Audit Commission, 2004a, p.2).  This also allowed the 
government, the Audit Commission and the authorities themselves to make a judgement as to whether 
the 47 Fire Services were ready for the rigours of the Comprehensive Performance Assessment process. 
The first fire service assessments were carried out in 2004/5, after the annual single and upper tier local 
authority assessments of 2002-2005 and the District Council Assessments of 2003 (Audit Commission 
2009). The methodology used is summarised in Figure 1 below.  
 
Figure 1. First Assessment Methodology 
 
The results were not published until after the election in 2005. As with the local authority assessments 
before them, the services were allocated a single overarching label and five categories of performance 
were used (Poor, Weak, Fair Good or Excellent). The Audit Commission, who carried out the 
inspections, also provided a ‘direction of travel’ judgement, to indicate whether they were improving and 
the extent of their improvement. The direction of travel included 4 categories; inadequate, adequate, 
performing well, and performing strongly.    This latter making sense only when you remember that the 
statutory requirement for services to operate was on the basis of facilitating continuous improvement. 
The first results are summarised in table 4 below. 
                                     
Fire Service 
Type of 
Authority 
Fire CPA 
Score 
2005 
                              
Fire Service 
Type of 
Authority 
Fire CPA 
Score 
2005 
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Avon  Combined Fair Leicester, 
Leicestershire and 
Rutland 
Combined Good 
Bedfordshire and Luton Combined Weak 
 
Lincolnshire County Poor 
Buckinghamshire and 
Milton Keynes 
Combined Weak 
 
London  Fire and 
Emergency 
Good 
Cambridgeshire and 
Peterborough 
Combined Good Merseyside Metropolitan Excellent 
Cheshire Combined Good Norfolk County Good 
Cleveland Combined Fair North Yorkshire Combined Good 
Cornwall County Fair Northamptonshire County Weak 
County Durham and 
Darlington 
Combined Fair Northumberland County Fair 
Cumbria County Fair Nottinghamshire 
and City of 
Nottingham 
Combined Fair 
Derbyshire Combined Fair Oxfordshire County Good 
Devon Combined Good Royal Berkshire Combined Good 
Dorset Combined Good Shropshire and 
Wrekin 
Combined Good 
East Sussex Combined Fair Somerset County Fair 
Essex Combined Fair South Yorkshire Metropolitan Weak 
Gloucestershire County Good Stoke on Trent and 
Staffordshire 
Combined Good 
Greater Manchester Metropolitan Good Suffolk County Fair 
Hampshire Combined Good Surrey  County Good 
Hereford and Worcester Combined Good Tyne and Wear Metropolitan Fair 
Hertfordshire Combined Fair Warwickshire County Good 
Humberside Combined Fair West Midlands Metropolitan Good 
Isle of Wight County Poor West Sussex County Fair 
Isles of Scilly County Fair West Yorkshire Metropolitan Good 
Kent and Medway Combined Excellent Wiltshire and 
Swindon  
Combined Weak 
 
Lancashire Combined Fair    
 
Table 4. The 2005 Results 
 
Outside of the service, it was not generally appreciated that the first fire assessments and the 
methodology (Audit Commission 2004) did not address the operational parts of the service (or the 
performance of the governance arrangements) but only addressed the non-operational parts of Fire 
Services.  Neither did it address emergency preparedness, a subject deemed too sensitive by the ODPM at 
the time. Within the operational parts of the services, the relative ambivalence to the national 
performance indicators was further compounded by the fact that in 1999 the Home Office had set (and 
later acknowledged) demonstrably arbitrary targets for some of its key performance indicators. The most 
notorious was the target for 15% of all operational firefighters to be women by 2009 (ODPM 2004). This 
would not have been achieved if every new recruit up to and including 2009 were women.   
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Nevertheless, the ODPM established a means of engaging with those FRAs assessed as poor or weak in 
order to address the improvement issues addressed by the CPA reports published in August 2005. 
“Building on experience of establishing lead official roles in local authorities assessed as poor or weak, the 
ODPM decided to from a small Fire and Rescue Improvement Support Team (FRIST) comprised of 
external contractors, some of whom had direct experience of providing improvement support in local authorities 
and others with specialist fire service knowledge… Whilst it drew on earlier guidance and protocols produced 
for local authorities, specific guidance produced for fire and rescue improvement stressed the aspiration for a 
voluntary relationship between ODPM and individual FRAs with a focus on the achievement of 
improvement… Although the possibility of statutory intervention by government is referred to… the prospect 
was viewed very much as a last resort and a step that would be taken unwillingly.” 
(Coleman 2009, p.1) 
As table 3 above shows, by June 2005 there were seven authorities (3 Combined, 3 County and 1 
Metropolitan) falling into the poor or weak categories: Bedfordshire, Buckinghamshire, the Isle of 
White, Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire, South Yorkshire and Wiltshire.  The ODPM established 
engagement arrangements with all seven authorities. 
The Fire and Rescue Act 2004 and the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.  
While relationships between the government, the local authorities and the regulators, were undoubtedly 
improving between 2002 and 2004, relationships between central government and the fire community 
were significantly deteriorating, following one of the most volatile periods in the services history. ‘If 2004 
was not the nadir in relationships between the government and the fire community then it was pretty 
close” (Murphy and Greenhalgh 2014a, p.14).   
The white paper that followed the Bain Review Our Fire and Rescue Services (ODPM 2003) was as 
unequivocal as the report that preceded it. The government promised “a radical overhaul of fire 
institutions to achieve strategic direction, service improvement and the provision of professional advice” 
and that it would take powers to determine the number and composition of new negotiating bodies for 
terms and conditions within the service (ODPM, 2003, p 9).  
It had specific chapters differentiating national, regional and local responsibilities, institutional reform and 
the framework for improving performance (chapters 4-6) and differentiated governance from 
management when identifying appropriate roles for Fire Authorities and for Fire Services (Chapter 7). 
The Act also changed their name to Fire and Rescue Services.  
In our view this was delivered to a: 
 “confused, dis-orientated and highly defensive fire community, becoming highly sceptical if not cynical about 
the intentions of the government of the day. It was also a service that was starting to feel isolated from its key 
collaborators as its key collaborators, as the other emergency services and wider local service deliverers moved 
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on from arguing about the need for modernisation and began embracing the new era of co-production of policy, 
and demonstrating improved performance and a willingness to embrace collaborative working”  
(Murphy and Greenhalgh, 2014a, p. 15).   
The new Integrated Personal Development System (IPDS) clarified the different roles of whole-time and 
retained firefighters and permitted direct recruitment into all levels of the service.  As Andrews (2010) has 
noted this linked career progression to ability rather than rank and hierarchical position for the first time.   
The Integrated Risk Management Planning (IRMP) process, which is still in operation, required fire 
authorities rather than the Secretary of State to determine resources levels, both human and capital, in 
relation to the pattern of risk to the public and the configuration of services (Fitzgerald, 2005) 
As we state in the article quoted above, the 2004 Act was however the first step in the rebuilding of a 
mutually respectful working relationship with the New Labour government and a rebuilding of the 
services historically high levels of trust with the public. 
The 2004 Fire and Rescue Services Act and the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, essentially replaced 
institutions and arrangements, policies and practises that were established by the 1947 Fire Services Act 
and the 1920 Emergency Powers and 1948 Civil Defence Acts. 
Although it was slow and cautious in its implementation, the Fire and Rescue Services Act fundamentally 
changed the approach to the assessment of risk and subsequent deployment of the service in response to 
the changing pattern of risks in the community (Murphy et al 2011, Murphy and Greenhalgh 2014a 
2014b). Prior to 2004 the system based its operations around the risk to buildings and property and used 
a gravity model to assess its performance in responding to emergency incidents. The 2004 Act and the 
Integrated Risk Management Planning it introduced, henceforth required authorities and services to base 
their risk assessments around the risk to people and communities as well as buildings and places.   
“The new system also reinforced the strong tradition within fire services of policy and decision making based 
upon a robust and effective evaluation of available data and information, i.e. with strategy and delivery being 
evidence-led, resting on robust, transparent and quality assured performance data that is systematically 
investigated and situationally appropriate”  
(Murphy and Greenhalgh, 2014b, p.37). 
The 2004 Act introduced the first National Framework for Fire Services (ODPM 2005), which we 
describe in the following section. In order to assist services in implementing the new approach, the 
ODPM provided new databases, tools and techniques designed to help services implement the new 
IRMP approach.  It started developing what became the 2006 FESC Toolkit Review Manual (DCLG 
2006) which had been made possible by significant improvements in digital mapping and improvements 
in IT and computing capacity. The 2004 Act encouraged protection and prevention as well as efficient 
and effective response. It encouraged greater collaboration and engagement of the services with both 
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emergency service partnerships and wider local delivery partnerships. It also saw a role for the private 
sector and the third sector, as well as direct delivery by the public sector. Finally, it brought Fire and 
Rescue Services into the Comprehensive Performance Assessment Regime (CPA).  
By 2004/05 there was general agreement between central and local government, the local government 
regulators and inspectorates, led by the Audit Commission, that the introduction of CPA had been a 
considerable success, but that a radical review and updating of the regime was required. Unlike the 
introduction of Best Value and the first iterations of CPAs (ODPM, 2002, 2003) the general principle and 
desirability of a new version was relatively uncontested.  
By 2005 it was generally accepted, albeit grudgingly, that CPA had generated substantial quantitative and 
qualitative improvements across local government services, as well as significant efficiencies in their 
running costs (Martin and Bovaird 2005, Audit Commission 2009). Fire and Rescue was about to be 
brought fully into the agenda.     
The Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 was equally radical but also clearly aligned with the governments’ 
new vision for Fire and Rescue Services. Under the Act, Fire and Rescue Services, together with the 
police and ambulance services’, became category one responders to all emergencies. The approach was to 
move from an overriding emphasis on response to a balance with more emphasis on prevention and 
forward planning, from tackling incidents to creating resilience, from focussing on a risk to property, to 
the risk to people. 
The designated responsible authorities and agencies, became jointly and severally responsible for 
preparing and responding to major incidents and emergencies, and for the recovery of the local 
communities affected. The previous emergency planning arrangements at national and local authority 
levels, were replaced by more comprehensive ‘resilience’ arrangements at local regional and national 
levels. These where to be based on  new risk registers and inter-agency planning and response 
arrangements co-ordinated by national, regional and local resilience boards.   
The first decade of the 21st century saw a series of major hazards, emergencies and domestic disasters, 
that unlike the 80’s and 90s, saw the emergency services at their operational best. The response to these 
emergencies was to test the new roles, responsibilities and institutions established by the Civil 
Contingencies Act. They were also going to help restore the services reputation with the government and 
more importantly with the general public. Cabinet Office Briefing Room A (COBRA) was about to enter 
the national lexicon.     
The first National Framework 2004-05 
In July 2004, immediately before parliament was in pirogue for the summer recess, the ODPM published 
the first Fire and Rescue National Framework for the year 2004-2005. This attempted the herculean task 
of bringing all of the various changes and initiatives of the pervious years into single document that ran to 
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over 80 pages. It followed a draft published for consultation in December 2003 and Nick Raynesford in 
his ministerial forward summed up the new approach.  Raynesford stressed: 
 the shift in emphasis to the prevention of fires was already having significant effects, 
 the National framework was a shared strategy that followed a consultation exercise, the response 
to which had been overwhelmingly positive, 
 that the framework, albeit a one-year document, was part of a long-term reform and 
improvement agenda and 
 that the government was committed to achieving long-term reductions in fire deaths and 
deliberate fires, including real improvement in the most disadvantaged areas,  via a new public 
service agreement. 
The framework stresses that this was not a national blueprint.  It was to give fire and rescue authorities 
the flexibility to meet the specific needs of their local communities and, ‘a firm foundation on which to 
build local solutions’ (Audit Commission 2005, p.4) 
The national framework did not cover Scotland and Northern Ireland as responsibility for fire and rescue 
services had already been fully devolved.  It also anticipated that a forthcoming Fire and Rescue Services 
Bill would devolve responsibility in Wales to the National Assembly for Wales. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to show how the fire service changed significantly in terms of its responsibilities 
and objectives through one of the most turbulent periods of its history. It has sought to chronicle the 
period from 1997, when Jack Straw inherited a Home Office that had little time or interest in the service 
up until May 2005, by which time it had become fully engaged with the Labour Governments public 
reform agenda. In May 2006 the service became the responsibility of the newly formed Department of 
Communities and Local Government and a succession of Secretaries of State from Ruth Kelly and Hazel 
Blears to John Denham, although each of these, like Prescott before them, appointed a designated fire 
minister.  If 1997 to 2005 was a period of turbulent relationships, upheaval and change for the service, 
2005 to 2010 was to represent a period of consolidation and progress.         
Raynsford describes this change as, 
 ‘from having been the largely passive custodian of existing standards (no local fire station could be closed 
without agreement of the Secretary of State) to a new more strategic role, publishing a national framework 
setting out expectations and giving guidance on how local fire and rescue authorities might respond but leaving 
individual authorities responsible for their own decisions. An inspection regime, involving the Audit 
Commission, was put in place to monitor how fire and rescue authorities were responding to the new 
challenges, using similar methodology to the Comprehensive Performance Assessment while the Fire Service 
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Inspectorate, which had notionally been responsible for this previously was to refocus its work on promoting 
good practice and supporting the service reform programme’ . 
(2016, p.155) 
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Footnotes 
1. Nick Raynesford was the minister responsible for the Fire Services from 2001 to 2005. Chapter 9 of his 
book relates specifically to his experiences with the fire service. His opening line states ‘This won’t take 
much of your time. The policy is benign neglect’  a quote from Home Office officials handing over 
responsibility for the service in 2001. Raynesfords’ book provides the political and ministerial perspective 
that complements this chapter.    
2. In 1986 the Audit Commission published ‘Value for Money in the Fire Service: Some Strategic Issues to be 
resolved’ followed in 1995 by two related reports ‘In the Line of Fire: Value for Money in the Fire Service – The 
National Picture’, and ‘In the Line of Fire: a Management Handbook on Value for Money in the Fire Service’. 
3. Audit Commission ‘Local Authority performance Indicators [1993/94]: Volume 3 Police and Fire Services 1995’. 
4. The Conservative Government had sought to hold individual agencies accountable for certain social 
problems. Howard took the view that tough sentencing and consequential incarceration for longer 
periods were responsible for the reduction in crime rates during his tenure. His predecessor Kenneth 
Clarke argued that more effective policing, and better individual, household and car vehicle security all 
contributed to the reductions. This view was supported by the rising recidivism rate for recently released 
prisoners which had reached 60% by 1997.     
5. Following his intervention to attempt to increase the minimum sentence of Robert Thompson and Jon 
Venable for the killing of James Bulger, Lord Donaldson a former master of the Rolls, famously 
described it as “institutionalised vengeance by a politician playing to the gallery”.  
6. In 1997 he was accused of interfering in the dismissal of the Director of the Prison Service Derek 
Lewis.  
7. Concerned about street crime, he had even called for a curfew on children in 1995.   
8. Sir Ian Macpherson Inquiry into the matters arising from the death of Stephen Lawrence.  
9. The following section leans heavily on our article Performance management in Fire and Rescue 
Services in Public Money and Management 33:3, 225-232. 
10. The OECD later described this as the ‘Strategic State’ see   
